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FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
ROBERT C. BASSETT
T O THOSE of us who value the personal liberties guaranteed by
the constitutional democracy of the United States of America, one
of the most priceless heritages is liberty of the press. To allow a free
press to be fettered is to fetter our own free thinking; it is a personal
loss.'
In the constant conflict between freedom and oppression, one which
will never cease, and particularly in the face of unusual encroach-
ments upon freedom of the press during a semi-wartime or wartime
period such as we seem to be entering, let us keep in mind that the
fundamental purpose of the First and Fourteenth Amendments was not
to guarantee to publishers the right to print, but to guarantee the
American people the right to read what is printed, to learn the facts
concerning public affairs, to weigh conflicting opinions, and to form
their own judgments, unhampered by the dictates of any one branch
of a government.
Omitting here consideration of state constitutions, the law of lib-
erty of the press in the United States of America emanates from the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom ... of the press .... ." The Fourteenth Amend-
ment provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." It was not until 1925
that the Supreme Court of the United States finally determined what
had previously, but uncertainly, been considered true, namely, that the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the States from encroaching upon
the liberty of the press with the same force and breadth as the First
Amendment prohibited such encroachment on the part of Congress. 2
In the light of existing United States Supreme Court decisions, it can
now be safely said that freedom of the press, as guaranteed in these two
amendments, one by express provision, the other by interpretation of
the word "liberty," one guarding against acts of Congress and the
other guarding against acts of the various States, is synonymous and
identical.
It was not until June 1, 1931, in the decision of Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes, in the leading case of Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel.
Olsen,3 that a fairly complete and coherent statement of the scope of
I Grosjean v. American Press Company, 297 U.S. 233, 56 Sup. Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed.
660 (1936).2 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138 (1925).
3 283 U.S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931).
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
freedom of the press was given us. Early decisions of the United States
Supreme Court generally confined themselves to an interpretation of
the First Amendment, and generally theorized that the First Amend-
ment enacted Blackstone's statement that:
"The liberty of the press ... consists in laying no previous re-
straints upon publications and not in freedom from censure for
criminal matter when published. ' 'sa
To Blackstone, legitimate suppression of the press began at the time of
publication, limiting the government from interference by censorship
or injunction before the words are printed; Blackstone, however, left
the right of punishment after publication, no matter how harmless or
essential to the public welfare such publication might be, to the limit-
less imagination of that government.4 Finally, after an historic series of
decisions, the United States Supreme Court, in 1919, under the able
pen of Mr. Justice Holmes (reversing his earlier stand as a Massa-
chusetts Judge), rejected the Blackstone theory and broadened the
American concept of freedom of the press.5
As expressed in the Schenck case, and in subsequent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, freedom of the press is now a broader
exemption from governmental encroachment-it is largely the right to
publish with good motives and for justifiable ends, whether it respects
government magistracy, or individuals, without previous censorship,
and with security against laws enacted by the legislative department of
governments or measures resorted to by the executive or judicial
branches of governments, for the purpose of stifling just criticism or
muzzling public opinion.6
The earlier Blackstonian theory has been disposed of in an unan-
swerable comment:
"The mere exemption from previous restraints cannot be all that
is secured by the constitutional provisions, inasmuch as ... the
liberty of the press might be rendered a mockery and a delusion,
and the phrase itself a byword, if, while every man was at lib-
erty to publish what he pleased, the public authorities might
nevertheless punish him for harmless publications.., the evils
to be prevented were in the censorship of the press merely, by
any action of the government by means of which it might pre-
vent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems
absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent
exercise of their rights as citizens. ' '6a
3a4 BL. COMM. *151.
4See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., "Freedom of Speech in Wartime" 32 HIv. L.
REv. 938.
5 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470 (1919).
6 11 Am. Jur. 1111.
6a COOLEY, CONsTTUiONAL LIMITATIONS (7th ed) 603.
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However, despite the rejection of the Blackstonian theory, and
despite this enlargement of the concept of freedom of the press to in-
clude protection after publication, we must nevertheless admit that we
are still left with a legal concept which has never received a definite
boundary and which still continues to live in the glowing phrases of
generality just set forth. Cases have been decided, but lines have not
been drawn. The courts have done little more than place obvious cases
on this side or that side of the line. As stated by the very droll Mr.
Chafee, supra,:
"To a Judge . .. these generalizations furnish as much help as
a woman forced like Isabella in 'Measure for Measure,' to
choose between her brother's death and loss of honor, might
obtain from the pious maxim, 'Do right.' . . . Nearly every free
speech decision, outside such hotly litigated portions as privi-
lege and fair comment in defamation, appears to have been de-
cided largely by intuition."
A brief summary of interesting cases will serve to illustrate the inde-
cisiveness of judicial interpretation.
In the leading case of Near v. State of Minnesota,7 the court held
void, as an infringement of the liberty of the press guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment, a Minnesota statute authorizing suppression by
injunction of a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, maga-
zine or other periodical, even though the statute gave the publisher the
right, before injunction issues, to show that the matter published was
true and published with good motives. The court held that freedom
from restraint did not depend upon proof of truth, although it admitted
the authority of the State to enact laws to promote the health, safety,
morals, and general welfare of its people, stating only that the balance
of adjustment must be reached between this liberty of the individual
and the right of the State. The court clearly pointed out that the
liberty of the press is not an absolute right but its abuse is punishable
by the State by means of libel laws and by contempt proceedings where
there is an obstruction of justice. The court rejected the Blackstone
theory on the ground that it is true as far as it goes, but that such im-
munity from previous restraint cannot be deemed to exhaust the con-
cept of the liberty. By way of partial definition, the court insists that
the liberty is not lost because the published material charges the com-
mission of crimes, or because the statute would have been effective
to prohibit the circulation of scandal tending to disturb the public peace
and to provoke crimes. In his dissent, Mr. Justice Butler argues the
Blackstonian theory and contends that the Minnesota statute should be
valid because it does not impress a previous restraint but provides for
an injunction which is previous only after one or more publications.
7283 U.S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931).
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The general rule of freedom of the press was again upheld by the
United States Supreme Court in Grosjean v. American Press Com-
pany." Here the court held void, under due process clause of the Four
teenth Amendment, a Louisiana statute levying a gross receipts license
tax upon all newspapers having a circulation of more than 20,000 copies
per week. Although the court might have considered the more obvious
question of denial of the equal protection of the laws, it preferred to
restate the more modem theory of freedom of the press by adopting
the view that such freedom consists in privilege against governmental
action "unduly deterring free expression or dissemination of opinion,
as well as from censorship."9
In its latest important interpretation of this liberty in Snyder v.
City of Milwaukee,0 the Supreme Court held invalid as a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, a Milwaukee ordinance making it un-
lawful for any person to circulate or distribute hand bills or other
printed matter in any public place within the City of Milwaukee. To
illustrate Mr. Chafee's theory that the Supreme Court of the United
States has failed to limit the boundaries of freedom of the press, but
rather has chosen to assume the responsibility of bringing up each case
on its own merits and deciding whether the encroachment in question
is "good" or "bad," Mr. Justice Roberts said for the court:
"In every case, therefore, where the legislative abridg-
ment of the rights is asserted, the courts should be astute to
examine the effect of the challenged legislation and so, as
cases arise, the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts
to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiability
of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free
enjoyment of the right ... we are of the opinion that the pur-
pose to keep the streets clean and of good appearance is in-
sufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits a person right-
fully on a public street from handing literature to one willing
to receive it."
Without detailing further precedents, it is sufficient to state that
liberty of the press is protected against judicial and executive restraint
as well as legislative, and in an identical degree.
However, there are limitations upon freedom of the press. As pre-
viously observed in Near v. Minnesota,"' the right is not an absolute
one. Nevertheless, limitations are recognized only in exceptional cases.
In a general way, again without definite boundaries, the Supreme Court
has recognized reasonable restrictions on the liberty necessary to pro-
mote and preserve public welfare, preventing utterances which tend to
8297 U.S. 233, 56 Sup. Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936).
9 See 49 Harv. L. Rev. 998.10 308 U.S. 147, 60 Sup. Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939).
11 Supra, note 7.
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corrupt public morals, incite to crime, or to disturb the public peace.
However, as observed from quoted dicta in this paper, leading cases
are not entirely in harmony with this thought. But such limitations have
been permitted as preventing the sale of magazines on streets in certain
restricted districts of a city' 2 within exceptions permitted under Snyder
v. Milwaukee,13 prohibiting by means of postal regulations established
by Congress, the transmission through the mails of corrupting and in-
jurious publications and articles,'14 preventing the publication of private
letters or photographs of anyone, thereby, under such decisions, holding
that the right of privacy frequently takes precedence over the liberty
of the press,' 5 prohibiting creditors or others from threatening to injure
the credit or reputation of a debtor by publishing his name as a bad
debtor in letters or circulars or by advertising a claim against him.' 6
Among the most interesting recent permissable restraints upon free-
dom of the press is that permitted in Associated Press v. National
Labor Relations Board,7 where the court held, over four dissents,
that the National Labor Relations Act does not abridge the First
Amendment by permitting newspaper employees to have the right to
form labor organizations and to bargain collectively. In a recent Case
Note, one of the editors of the Harvard Law Review upholds the deci-
sion by citing the analogous right to restrict freedom of the press by con-
tempt for libelous statements, Toledo Newspaper Company v. United
States,' to prohibit publication of items impeding the conduct of war,
Schenk v. United States,19 to impose non-discriminatory taxation on
the publishing business, GrosJean v. America Press Company,"
to subject newspapers to the anti-trust laws, Indiana Farmers Guide
Publishing Company v. Prairie Farmer Publishing Company.
2
'
The most interesting restraint on liberty of the press, particularly
in view of the recently enacted peace time draft and conscription legis-
lation by the United States Congress, and our proximity to war, lies in
the sanctioned right of government to prevent actual obstruction to its
recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or
the number and location of troops or utterances which become a hin-
drance to the conduct of war by a government. Liberty of the press has
an entirely different concept during wartime than during peacetime.
American experience with the Sedition Acts of 1917 and 1918 should
serve to reconstruct memories of the possible extent of such limitations.
12Chicago v. Rhine, 363 Ill. 619, 2 N.E. (2d) 905 (1936).
Is Supra, note 10.14 Horner v. United States, 143 U.S. 207, 12 Sup. Ct. 407, 36 L.Ed. 126 (1892).
'5 Contra, Corliss v. E. W. Walker Company, 64 Fed. 280 (C.C.D. of Mass.)(1894).16 State v. McCabe, 135 Mo. 450, 37 S.W. 123 (1896).
'17301 U.S. 103, 57 Sup. Ct. 650, 81 L.Ed. 953 (1937).
18 247 U.S. 402, 38 Sup. Ct. 560, 62 L.Ed. 1186 (1918).
19 249 U.S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470 (1919).
20297 U.S. 233, 56 Sup. Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936).
21293 U.S. 268, 55 Sup. Ct. 182, 79 L.Ed. 356 (1934).
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Let it be sufficient to quote the court in the leading case of Schenk v.
United States, supra, in this regard:
"When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time
of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance
will not be endured so long as men fight and that no court could
regard them as protected by any constitutional right."
Pending Congressional proposals to give the President power to con-
script newspapers and radio stations should be examined in the light of
this enlarged freedom.
Concluding, let it be remembered that each case in this field will
go to the court for determination of whether the restriction is good or
evil. Landmarks are few, and boundary lines are fewer. The most clear-
ly defined rule of precedent which we have been able to discover was that
handed down by the Judge to the man who was arrested for swinging
his arms and hitting another in the nose, and who, when he asked the
Judge if he did not have the right to swing his arms in a free country,
received the reply, "Your right to swing your arms ends just where the
other man's nose begins."
